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Sommer: Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or Easy

CAUSES OF THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

EXPLOSION: DEBTOR ABUSE OR EASY CREDIT?
Henry J. Sommer*
Between June and September of 1998, the United States House of
Representatives and United States Senate passed legislation to radically
change the Federal Bankruptcy Code,' which was last amended by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("BRA").' Representative George
Gekas, Chair of the Judiciary Subcommittee in the United Sates House
of Representatives which has jurisdiction over bankruptcy, introduced
the bill that was eventually passed by the House. When introducing the
bill, Representative Gekas stated:
The greatest, and perhaps most dangerous, irony I have come
across in the past decade is that despite economic growth, low inflation, low unemployment, and increasing personal income, our nation
has seen a[n] alarming increase in the number of bankruptcy filings1.3 million in 1997 to be exact. Think about that for a second. That [is]
more than one family per every hundred in the United States and over
$40 billion in debt that has been erased-in a year of strong economic

growth.4
Furthermore, he stated that the "so-called 'bankruptcy of conven* Of Counsel, Miller, Frank & Miller, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Supervising Attorney,
Consumer Bankruptcy Assistance Project, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This Article is based on a
lecture given as part of the Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professorship Lecture Series at
Hofstra University School of Law on April 1, 1998.
1. The House passed its version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 on June 10, 1998.
See 144 CONG. REc. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1998); Katharine Q. Seelye, House Approves Legislation to Curb Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at A22. The Senate passed its
version of the same bill on September 23, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S 10,767 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1998); Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Votes to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse by Consumers, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 24, 1998, at A25.
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong.
4. 144 CONG. REC. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas) (emphasis
added).
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ience' is a new phenomenon, borne out of the loss of stigma the word
'bankruptcy' once, but no longer, carried."' Representative Gekas then
went on to state that the "lack of stigma has become a weed infesting
the bankruptcy landscape,"6 which sprouted from the BRA, and "has
spread as bankruptcy became viewed more as a financialplanning tool
...and a first choice, rather than a last resort.",7 He cited recent cases
filed by celebrities such as Willie Nelson, Burt Reynolds, Kim Basinger, M.C. Hammer, Toni Braxton, and Arizona Governor Fife Symington, as examples of en vogue bankruptcy." Representative Gekas also
stated:
[T]he past six years have been a period of unparalleled economic
growth-as any Wall Street broker would be happy to tell us. So obviously the growth in [bankruptcy filings] is not a response to the economy.
Nor can we justifiably [blame] the credit card industry[,] [because]
...[c]redit card debt accounts for only 16% of all bankruptcy debt.9
According to Representative Gekas' statement, bankruptcy costs
every household in the United States $400 because creditors pass on
their losses in the form of higher interest rates and prices.'0 Representative Gekas therefore introduced his bill to provide for a "needs-based"
bankruptcy system, in which consumer debtors would get only as much
relief as they really needed." He also cited his former colleague and
former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, in saying that "we must make
an effort to restore the justifiable sense of embarrassment
Americans
2
once felt asking their neighbors to shoulder their burden."'
This Article examines first, whether the statements Representative
Gekas made are correct and second, how he came to make those statements and introduce his bill in the Congress.
One thing there is no doubt about is that consumer bankruptcy
cases have gone up dramatically, and they continue to go up.'3 It is true
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. See id. For a discussion of recent celebrity bankruptcy filings, see George Kalogerakis et
al., RedAlert!, PEOPLE, Feb. 24, 1997, at 100.
9. 144 CONG. REc. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas) (emphasis
added).
10. See id.
11. See id. at E87.
12. IL at E89.
13. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit CardDefaults, Credit CardProfits, and Bankruptcy,
71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 253 fig.2 (1997); Michael Higgins, Putting Back the Bite, A.B.A. J.,
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that over one in one hundred households will file a bankruptcy case this
year and if the trend continues, it is likely that 10% of all households
will have filed by the year 2003. Chances are that most people may

know someone who has filed a bankruptcy case, though they may not
know that the person has filed. The tougher question, however, is why
bankruptcies are rising. Have we become a nation of deadbeats, of
credit addicts, or are there other causes?
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("Commission"), an
advisory group created by Congress in 1994, examined this issue at
some length.14 Bankruptcy debtors, and the lawyers who represent them,
testified in front of the Commission that families were driven to bankruptcy by the same sorts of things that had always driven them to bankruptcy. They lost their jobs; they had medical bills they could not pay;
they became disabled; they experienced marital separations, which created the additional expenses of a second household or a loss of income
through failure of one spouse to pay alimony or support.' 6 The immediate triggering causes have been things like mortgage foreclosures on
their homes, repossessions of their cars, lawsuits to collect debts, wage
garnishments, and harassment by debt collectors calling at all hours, itself causing marital breakups and emotional problems.
The Commission also learned that there are many more people
these days without medical insurance, that the divorce rates in this
country are higher, and although the average family income in this
country is up and unemployment is down, the benefits of prosperity are
not being shared by all." We have gone through an era of unprecedented
mergers and downsizing. 9 Many of those who were laid off did find
new jobs, but at lower wages. The enormous growth in two income
households that we have experienced lessens the catastrophe of a primary breadwinner's layoff, but makes job loss, and the ensuing financial disruption, twice as likely for the family.

June 1998, at 74, 74.
14. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147
(1994); see also NATIONAL BANKR. REVimW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NExT TWENTY YEARs
47-53 (1997) (detailing the creation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].

15. See COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 14, at 66-68, 82-83.
16. See id. at 84-86.
17. See id. at 86; Visa, Executive Summary: Consumer Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy DebtorSurvey (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http:llwww.abiworld.org/stats/visa/96debtor.html>.
18. See COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 14, at 84-85.
19. See Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, the Abusive
Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 843 (1998).
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In fact, the median income of those consumers in bankruptcy has
not increased. In inflation-adjusted dollars, it is less than it was before
the last recessionY In addition, unemployment benefits, public assistance, and medical assistance are all being cut dramatically.2' While the
stockbroker whom Representative Gekas wanted to ask about the economy probably feels he is doing great, that is not the case with the people
who are actually filing for bankruptcy.2
The Commission also heard testimony from a number of experts,
academics, and other researchers such as the Congressional Budget Office, that historically, the number of bankruptcies has closely tracked
the debt loads of American families and that those debt loads have gone
up enormously over the past decade and a half, beginning around the
time Congress and many states largely deregulated the consumer credit
market.2' In other words, bankruptcies went up dramatically because
consumer debt went up dramatically. 24
It is fairly common knowledge that commercial interest rates and
the cost of funds to lenders went down significantly over the past ten
years.' While consumer interest rates followed suit on home mortgages
and car loans, they hardly moved on credit cards. 6 In fact, many fees,
such as late charges, have gone up.27 At the same time, lenders have also
enjoyed the cost savings of improved technology-it was not that long

20. See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1096 fig.2, app. at
1102-03 tbl.1 (1998). The large majority of those filing bankruptcy cases have incomes below the
national median. See id. at 1087. In fact, there is some evidence that bankruptcy debtors are worse
off in terms of income now than they were in the 1980s. See id. at 1098; see also COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 14, at 83 n.124 ("[D]ebtors in the 1990s are in as much or more financial
trouble as debtors in the early 1980s.").
21. See Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the Time:
1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J.Soc. POL'Y & L. 3, 4

(1996).
22. Those who actually file bankruptcy cases have much lower median incomes than those
outside bankruptcy. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1087.
23. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 256-57, 260-61; see also Warren, supra note 20, at 108183 (discussing the Congressional Budget Office's analysis of household indebtedness and the link
between the deregulation of credit card interest rates and the rate of consumer bankruptcy filings).
24. Professor Warren arrives at the same conclusion regarding the explanation behind the
rise in consumer bankruptcies. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1080-84. Warren feels "[tihe simple
explanation of the rise in filings-bankruptcies rise as household debt rises-is undeniable." Id. at
1084.
25. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 261; see also Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of
Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 50, 54 fig.1 (1991) (demonstrating
the decrease in the cost of funds to banks spanning the years 1982-1989).
26. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 261; Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argumentfor Legal Controls on Credit CardInterestRates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1996).
27. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 263.
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ago that a credit card transaction involved a person calling for an

authorization number, making a paper record, sending that record to the
bank, and that record then being keyed into a computer. Now, this is all
accomplished with the swipe of a card.2
All this has made the credit card business tremendously profitable.
Over the past few years the returns of credit card banks, which are the
primary credit card lenders, have been twice as high as the general return on assets for commercial banks in the same period, even when their
defaults, which are not really losses but just decreases in those profits,
are taken into account.29 Moreover, as Representative Gekas' stockbroker would tell you, banks in general have been very profitable in recent
years.3"
This success has, in turn, produced the massive marketing of credit
cards we have seen over the past four years, with literally billions of solicitations mailed out each year and many more solicited by phone or in
person. 3' Everyone has experienced some form of credit card solicitation
where you are given a gift or prize if you sign up for a credit card.32 The

amount of credit card loans at the end of 1996 was more than twice as
much as in 1992, just four years earlier.33 While some of that is convenience use, with cardholders paying their full balance each month, the
Federal Reserve estimates that convenience use represents only about
one seventh of the total34
Part of what has happened is that lower-income people have received credit, what the lenders call the "democratization of credit."35
28. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implicationsof Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479,492 (1998).
29. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 259 fig.7; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, House to Vote
Today on Legislationfor Bankruptcy Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A18 ("Credit-card
lending is among the most profitable sectors of an intensely competitive banking industry that has
little room for growth ....).
30. Commercial banks have been posting record earnings for a number of years. See John R.
Wilke, Banks' Profits Climbed to Recordin 3rd Quarter,WALL ST.J., Dec. 12, 1997, at A2.
31. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 92; Ausubel, supra note 13, at 264.
32. "The credit card companies have been saturating the public with their aggressive marketing tactics as they engage in a fierce competitive struggle for market share." Charles A. Docter,
hnpact of Credit Card Use on Consumer Bankruptcies, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 1, 42.
The credit card companies have also been increasingly targeting young teenaged students. "Cards
are available at many colleges to almost any student-no income, no credit history and no parental
signature required." See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 93.
33. See Docter, supra note 32, at 42 tbl.
34. See Statements to the Congress,82 FED. REERVEBULL. 1000, 1001 (1996).
35. See Gwen A. Ashton, Community Reinvestment Act and Consumer Lending, 16 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 1, 7 (1997); Kathleen E. Keest, Lending Practices: Consumer CreditLitigation
as a Search for the Balance, in 2 CONSUMER FiNANcIAL SERVICES LmGATION 425, 427 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-990, 1997).
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Due to the increased spread between credit card rates and the cost of
funds to lenders, it became profitable to go deeper into the risk pool, to
give more credit than previously, and to give it to families who could
not obtain it before, families more likely to default. In fact, one of the
most rapidly growing parts of the market is what is called the "subprime market" which provides high rate mortgages and car loans to
people who are poor credit risks.36 You've probably seen the ads"Bankruptcy? Bad credit? No problem. We'll give credit to anyone."
The result-a lot more families living near the financial edge. 7 A
lot more families have no savings and are encumbered by large debts,
whose budgets could be disrupted by a big plumbing bill or car repair.
These are families who are not financially sophisticated, who do not understand the enormous cost of just making minimum credit card payments that would take sometimes thirty-five or forty years to amortize
the debt,3" and who are proud to have "good credit" because the credit
card companies keep soliciting them to borrow more. In fact, cardholders who carry large balances are the most attractive customers because
the creditors make the most money from them. It is pretty common to
see families with incomes of $15,000 or $20,000 with two or even three
times that much in debt4° on numerous cards, who keep making all the
minimum payments until something disrupts their income. Then there is
a quick downward spiral with the $25 monthly late charge on each card,
the acceleration of the payments, and the inability to dig out of a very
deep hole.
Yet these families struggle to avoid bankruptcy. They do things
like take on a second job or give up their health insurance to avoid
bankruptcy. Visits to consumer credit counseling agencies have gone up
even faster than bankruptcy rates.4 The creditors claim there is no more
stigma to bankruptcy,42 but they have not produced any debtors willing
36. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 92-93; Warren, supra note 20, at 1099.
37. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 84-85; Warren, supra note 20, at 1099;
Christine Dugas, Going Broke, USA TODAY, June 10, 1997, at 1A.
38. See COMMISSIONREPORT, supranote 14, at 93.
39. See Warren, supranote 20, at 1083, 1099.
40. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 83; Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the NationalBankruptcy
Review Commission's Proposalsas a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); see
also Warren, supra note 20, at app. 1102-03 tbl.1 (listing the distribution of income and debts for
Chapter 7 debtors for several different years).
41. It has been estimated that in 1997 alone some two million Americans sought some form
of credit counseling. See Bill Kent, When the Credit Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 25, 1998,
§ 14, at 1.
42. In the introduction of his bill, Representative Gekas asserted this creditor-friendly theme.
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to come forward to say that they are proud to have filed. From time to
time at the Consumer Bankruptcy Assistance Project, we are asked if we
can find debtors willing to be interviewed by the media, and it is very
hard to find people willing to have their stories publicized, even those
whose bankruptcies clearly resulted from circumstances beyond their
control, like disability. 3 Creditors also blame lawyer advertising for the
increase in bankruptcy filings.44 Of course, lawyer advertising does
make people more aware, but that has been true since the late 1970s. 45
And no significant changes in the restrictions on lawyer advertising
have occurred since then.46
It is true that with more people filing for bankruptcy these days, it
is more likely those people filing will be a relative or a friend of someone else with financial problems. Awareness is up. That is different than
lack of stigma however; it just means people who need relief are more
likely to be aware of it. In fact, the same arguments were made in the
early 1980s-that the rise in filings at that time was caused by lawyer
advertising and lack of stigma.47 At bottom, the creditors' argument that
there is no more stigma is really based upon circular reasoning. According to the creditors, there are so many bankruptcies these days, so there
must not be any more stigma. Clearly, the creditors then argue it is this
lack of stigma that has caused the rise in bankruptcies.
Is the rise in bankruptcy filings the fault of the creditors? Not exactly, since it is not a matter of fault. The creditors have acted like other
profit maximizers under our system and have lent more money to make

See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
43. "'Bankruptcy is not a free ride. Nobody who is bankrupt is having any fun."' Kent, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting Robert Wood, a Manasquan, New Jersey lawyer and Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee).
44. For examples of lawyer advertising being cited as an encouragement or cause of the increase in bankruptcy filings, see Braucher, supra note 40, at 5, and Resolved: The Time Has Come
for Means-Testing Consumer Bankruptcy, A Debate (Excerpts), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 1998,
at 6, 45 [hereinafter Resolved].
45. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court held that lawyer advertising is protected under
the First Amendment as commercial speech and thus, may not be restrained or subject to blanket
suppression. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977). Moreover, the
Commission asserted in its report that the social and economic "picture [surrounding bankruptcy]
has not changed appreciably since the early 1980s." COM AlSSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 83.
46. See Elizabeth D. Whitaker & David S. Coale, ProfessionalImage and Lawyer Advertising, 28 T-x. TECH. L. REv. 801, 803-08 (1997) (discussing the state of the law on lawyer advertising since 1977).
47. See, e.g., Philip Schuchman & Thomas L. Rhorer, PersonalBankruptcy Datafor OptOut Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1982); see also Warren, supra note
20, at 1093-94 (discussing the credit industry's efforts in the 1980s to encourage bankruptcy reform).
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greater profits. The spread between their cost of funds and interest rates
allows them to sustain more defaults.48 Even with increased defaults,
credit card lending was, and still is, very profitable.49
But the rise in bankruptcy filings is an entirely predictable conse-

quence of the creditors' activities. Not only do we have the long history
of bankruptcy tracking consumer debtloads over years, 0 it also follows

plain, common sense economics. If you have more families in debt, and
families with more debt, it would be very surprising if the number of
bankruptcy cases did not go up.
The credit card lenders say that their debt accounts for only 16% of
the total debt,5' and, Representative Gekas argued that the credit card

industry is not to blame." First of all, those figures include home mortgage debts which are long term debts, as well as car loans, which are
close to a necessity for most Americans.53 Therefore, using a percentage
of total debt is somewhat misleading. It is the credit card sector that is

growing the most rapidly. In 1976, bank credit card debt was 5% of all
consumer credit. In 1996, it was one third, over a sixfold increase. 4 The
Consumer Federation of America has estimated that 56%-60% of all
households carry revolving consumer credit balances that average
$6000 to $7000."5 The creditors' own study found that credit cards made

up over 35% of non-housing debt in Chapter 7 cases, averaging over

48. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 263.
49. See id at 249, 258-61.
50. See Docter, supra note 32, at 1; Warren, supra note 20, at 1082-83; see also Ausubel,
supra note 13, at 253-54 (discussing the correlation between bankruptcy filings and credit card
delinquencies).
51. See Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
andAdmin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1998), available in Westlaw,
Congtmy Library, 1998 WL 8992756 (written statement of Bruce L. Hammonds, Senior ViceChairman and CEO of MBNA Corp.). Moreover, while introducing his bill, Representative Gekas
put forth the same proposition. See 144 CONG. REC. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Gekas).
52. See 144 CONG. REc. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas),
53. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
54. See Ausubel, supra note 13, at 254 n.13. Furthermore, consumer credit numbers, incidentally, do not include home mortgages. See Glenn B. Canner et al., Household Sector Borrowing and the Burden ofDebt, 81 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 323, 337 (1995).
55. See Debit Cards and Unsolicited Loan Checks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 60
(1997) (statement of Steven Brobeck, Executive Director, Consumer Federation of America).
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$19,000.6 After you take out the car loan, it is likely to be almost 50%

in many cases. 7
Are all debtors blameless? No, but many are-it is hard to fault
someone who takes on a modest amount of debt and then cannot pay
debts because of a disability or layoff. Some should have been wiser;
they probably took on more debt than they should have, more than most
of us would have. A lot of that is a matter of education, and education
in family budgeting is sorely lacking in our schools. 9 Many of my clients have no idea what they owe, much less the enormous amount they
pay in finance charges. They only know the monthly payments they are
making.
And you have to remember the tremendous amount of marketing
° Everyone has seen the adthat is done to induce people to incur credit.W

vertisements--"No payments until

1999. ' 61

Soon it will be no payments

until the next millennium. If creditors spent even 1% of what they spend
on marketing on consumer education, some of these problems would
not exist.
However, even for those people who do get in debt over their
heads, who have made unwise decisions, what good does it do to punish
them by denying them any way to get out from under, forbidding them
from getting the fresh start bankruptcy provides? An analogy to tobacco
can be drawn. Yes, people who smoke are making an unwise decision,
often
by advertising.6
no one of
suggests
closing
63 Bankruptcy
wards.promoted
filings are aYet,
symptom
the disease
of the
too cancer
much

56. See JOHN M. BARRON & MICHAEL E. STATEN, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, PERSONAL
BANKRutrPcY: A REPORT ON PETITIONERS' ABILITY-To-PAY 21 tbl.8 (1997) [hereinafter CRC
STUDY].
57. See icL
58. As of February 1998, consumer debt increased $7 billion to a total of $1.244 trillion. See
ConsumerDebt Rose by $7 Billion in February,WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at A2.
59. See Steve Holiga & Andrea Stowers, The Mounting Casualties from Bankruptcy,
MORTGAGE BANKIG, Aug. 1997, at 24,30.
60. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
61. For one such example of this type of advertisement, see NEWSDAY (Long Island), Aug.
11, 1998, at A31.
62. Tobacco companies consistently spend billions of dollars on advertisements and promotions, including advertisements on the Internet. It is estimated that in 1996 the tobacco industry
spent $5.1 billion on advertising and promotions. See Jeffrey Taylor, Senator May Push Limited
Tobacco Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at B4.
63. In fact, people, and more importantly corporations, continue to donate millions of dollars
to the prevention and treatment of cancer. See Jon G. Auerbach, Children's Hospital of Boston
Stands to Gain If Cancer Drug Gets to Market, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1998, at B2; Tara ParkerPope, Revlon Is a Cancer Drug's Unlikely Benefactor, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1998, at B 1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27:33

debt, not the cause. The bankruptcy court is a hospital for the financially
ailing.
It is true that there is some outright fraud and abuse in the bankruptcy system. As in any system, there will always be some dishonest
people. But ask the bankruptcy trustees, and they will tell you that the
biggest abuses are in the cases of business debtors, not consumer debtors. 64 Indeed, if you look at the publicized celebrity bankruptcy cases
mentioned by Representative Gekas, not one of them was a consumer
case-most involved business transactions, bad investments, and the
like.6 In any event, the fact that there is a small amount of fraud in a
system does not mean you need to change the basic system. Everyone
knows that there is some fraud in the claiming of business tax deductions, but the Republicans are not advocating the elimination of tax deductions.
So let us review for a second. Indeed bankruptcy filings have gone
up greatly,"6 but the cause seems more related to increased debt than
anything else, like a sudden transformation of Americans into deadbeats
with no sense of shame. The causes of bankruptcy are the same as they
always have been, 67 but today more people live on the financial edge, in
an unstable economy that has not been so prosperous for those in the
lower half.68
Well, if that is the case, how did Representative Gekas come to believe that people are filing "bankruptcies of convenience," using bankruptcy as a "financial planning tool," that the stigma is gone, and that
the bankruptcy laws need radical reform? Did he peruse the bankruptcy
statistics one day and suddenly become astounded by the great increase?
Did he talk to his constituents and find a lot of people who filed bankruptcy cases as a matter of convenience when they really could have
paid their debts? Did he, or any of his staff, sit down and study the
bankruptcy laws to come up with better ways to do things?
Not likely; things don't work that way in Washington. Members of
Congress are extremely busy and they do not have much time to study
64. "Where are no data showing that the consumer bankruptcy system is shot through with
abuse." Elizabeth Warren, A PrincipledApproach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
483, 493 (1997). In fact, an emerging abuse of the bankruptcy system may be "the use of Chapter
13 by business debtors." Alvin C. Harrell, The Consumer Issues Agenda of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 9, 15 (1997).
65. See generally Kalogerakis et al., supra note 8 (explaining that many celebrity bankruptcy cases involved bad business transactions).
66. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
67. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 82-83.
68. See Dugas, supra note 37, at JA; Resolved, supra note 44, at 44.
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statistics or pore over the laws they have passed or are in the process of
passing. The story of the move for changes in the bankruptcy laws is
pretty typical of what does go on, and it is a story of money, power, and
politics.
What does happen is that when an industry group wants the laws
changed, it spends some money.6 9 One thing everyone hears about, of
course, is campaign contributions, and those contributions buy access."
When an average citizen goes to the office of a member of Congress, he
or she usually ends up speaking to a staff person for that member, a staff
person who may or may not ever convey the citizen's thoughts to the
member. When the American Bankers Association, Visa, and Household Finance go to a member's office, they talk to the member personally." Of course, the member is aware of any campaign contribution that
organization made, so the member likes to accommodate them if he or
she can. Surely Representative Gekas met with the creditor lobbyists
many times before he introduced his bill.72 I am not aware of any meeting Representative Gekas had with any consumer organization or consumer representative, though I did get a meeting with a member of his
staff.
But the story starts even before any lobbying of Representative
Gekas or other members of Congress. In the first instance, the bankruptcy "issue" had to be created. For that task, the creditors hired public
relations firms. What these firms do, as they like to say, is "get the word
out" about an issue. They issue press releases, they create press events,
contact reporters, telling them that the big rise in bankruptcy cases is a
good story and here are some people you can talk to about itrepresentatives of Visa and Mastercard who are suffering these terrible
losses due to bankruptcy.73 They get writers of newspaper columns to

69. For a discussion of the role of lobbying in the recent bankruptcy reform movement, see
Robert Cwiklik, Ivory Tower Inc.: When Research and Lobbying Mesh, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998,
at Bl; Bill McAllister, Reopening Chapter 7, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at A23; Jacob M.
Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge, CreditorsLobby Hard to Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1998, at Al; Seelye, supra note 29, at A18.
70. See Jackie Calmes, Images Shape Debates Nationwide, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at
A10; Chas. W. Freeman Jr., ForeignPolicyfor Sale..., WALL ST. J., June 16, 1998, at A18; Greg
Hitt & Phil Kuntz, Who Are Those People Donating to Politicos?Secrets of a GOP PAC, WALL
ST. J., May 28, 1998, at Al.
71. See Hitt & Kuntz, supra note 70, at Al; Paulette Thomas, At Garn Institute, S&L Executives Get to Rub Shoulders with U.S. Regulators, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1989, at A20; Leslie
Wayne, A Special Dealfor Lobbyists: A Getaway with Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at
Al.
72. See supranote 69.
73. See Fred R. Beakley, CreditorsSeek TougherBankruptcy Laws, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 17,
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talk to these people and then write pieces about how terrible it is that so
many people are walking away from their debts. 4 It is apparent from
reading the newspapers that every quarter when new bankruptcy statistics come out, Visa issues a press release, even before the official announcement by the courts.5 Those press releases include quotes from
Visa officials about the end of the stigma, about bankruptcies of convenience, and many of those quotes end up in newspaper and magazine articles.76
The public relations firms also come up with the catchphrases:
"bankruptcies of convenience," "bankruptcy as a financial planning
tool," and "bankruptcy as a first option rather than a last resort." These
phrases constantly appear in creditor literature and in the newspaper articles,' and ultimately they appeared in Representative Gekas' speech."
These phrases, as well as the phrase "needs-based bankruptcy," are the
creditors' description of their proposal to prohibit many debtors from
filing for Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy and to allow them only to file
under Chapter 13, a government-run payment plan.79 These phrases are
the soundbites of the story. What could sound more reasonable than
giving someone only as much bankruptcy as he or she needs?
One of the big press events created by the creditors was the announcement of a study they funded. An institution called the Credit Research Center ("CRC"), formerly at Purdue University but apparently
moved to Georgetown, conducted the study.t0 The study was previously
called the Purdue Study; it is also now known as the Georgetown Study,
or the Staten Study, after the person who conducted it.8 The CRC is

1996, at A2; McAllister, supra note 69, at A23; Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al. "'The credit
industry has launched a massive media and lobbying campaign to discredit the consumer bankruptcy system."' Robert D. Hershey Jr., Creditors Lead Push to Curb Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 10, 1998, § 3, at 10 (quoting Gary Klein, National Consumer Law Center).
74. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 69, at A23; Schlesinger, supranote 69, at Al.
75. See, e.g., Visa Reports 1.3 Million Consumer Filings in 1997, CONSUMER BANKR.
NEWs, Jan. 29, 1998, at I. Moreover, "Visa has been the leader of the movement for bankruptcy
reform legislation. The San Francisco-based company claims to be the largest repository of information on bankruptcy statistics and trends." Lisa Fickenscher, GAO Disputes CardGroups' Bankruptcy Reform Case, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 1998, at 1.
76. See, e.g., Bleakley, supra note 73, at A2; Cwiklik, supra note 69, at BI; Schlesinger,
supranote 69, at Al.
77. See Schlesinger, supranote 69, at Al.
78. See 144 CONG. REC. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
79. See id. at E87; Henry E. Hildebrand III, The Hidden Costs of Bankruptcy Reform, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 1998, at 16.
80. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1088; Cwiklik, supra note 69, at B1; Schlesinger, supra
note 69, at Al.
81. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1088; Cwiklik, supra note 69, at Bi; Fickenscher, supra
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funded by the credit industry, 2 and not surprisingly, their studies seem
to always support what the credit industry wants to do.83 It is kind of like
the Tobacco Institute for the credit industry."
Regardless, with great fanfare, the creditors announced the preliminary results of the study to the Commission in 1996.85 Subsequently,
the creditors announced later results. 6 The study claimed that 25% of
Chapter 7 debtors could pay at least 30% of their debts if they were
forced into Chapter 13 payment plans, although the numbers kept
changing with each announcementY More tellingly, however, over half
the debtors could pay nothing, and the remainder very little." Alto-

gether, the study estimated that about 10-15% of the total debts discharged in Chapter 7 cases could be paid. 9
When the creditors took this study to the Commission, which was

considering changing the law, some academics on the Commission staff
and others who testified kept asking some difficult questions.' ° Critics of
the study pointed out that creditors included debts that those debtors
were paying anyway, like car loans, as debts that Chapter 7 debtors
could pay.9 Most Chapter 7 debtors need their cars to go to work or to
shop, and if they do not pay those loans their cars will be repossessed; 92
therefore, debtors pay those loans. They also pay debts which cannot be

note 75, at 1.
82. See supra note 81.
83. See Cwiklik, supra note 69, at B1.
84. See generally Phil Kuntz, PactSends Powerful Lobby on Its Way to the Ash Can, 'WALL
ST. J., June 23, 1997, at B 10 (explaining the history and role of the Tobacco Institute).
85. See Rob Wells, Amid Record Chapter 7 Filings,Bankers Urge Overhaul of Bankruptcy
Code, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 18, 1996, at 4.
86. The Credit Research Center ("CRC") released their study, entitled Personal Bankruptcy:
A Report on Petitioners' Ability-to-Pay, on October 6, 1997. See CRC STUDY, supra note 56. The
CRC issued a response to criticisms of its study the following year. See MICHAEL E. STATEN &
JOHN M. BARRON, CREDrr RESEARCH CENTER, RESPONSE FROM PROFESSORS MICHAEL E. STATEN
(GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS) AND JOHN M. BARRON (KRANNERT GRADUATE
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY), AUTHORS OF THE CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER
STUDY "PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: A REPORT ON PETrrIONERS' ABILITY TO PAY" 1 (1998)
[hereinafter CRC RESPONSE]; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
87. See CRC STUDY, supra note 56, at 25 & tbl.11.
88. See id. at 24 fig.6.
89. Seeid. at 26 tbl.12.
90. See Gary Klein, Means Tested Bankruptcy: What Would It Mean?, 28 U. MEa. L. REV.
711,716 (1998); Cwidik, supranote 69, at B1.
91. See Klein, supranote 90, at 716; Gary Klein, ConsumerBankruptcy in the Balance: The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Recommendations Tilt Toward Creditors, 5 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 293, 294 (1997); Warren, supra note 20, at 1089.
92. Cf. Klein, supra note 91, at 294 (asserting that debtors need to make their ongoing car
payments).
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discharged, like student loans, 93 many taxes, 4 and alimony and support."
The Commission asked the CRC if it could run the numbers to see what
could be paid after those debts were taken into account, but the CRC refused. 96 Academics asked if they could examine the data to run some
numbers themselves, and the CRC failed to permit that.97 Critics also
pointed out that by assuming a five year repayment period, the study
was almost doubling the normal length of a Chapter 13 payment plan
under current law.98
Furthermore, the report suffered from other problems. It did not
take into account the fact that debtors' incomes were unstable and could
not reliably be predicted to remain the same for sixty months." In fact,
under the current law, two-thirds of the Chapter 13 plans voluntarily
filed by debtors are not completed.' So most of the money that would
supposedly be collected, even under the study's assumptions, would not
really be there. In reality, only a tiny percentage of Chapter 7 filers
could make any significant payments 101
to creditors beyond what they already continue to pay after bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, none of that affected the creditor press machinery.
That study continued to be cited as fact for months in newspapers and
magazines around the country.' 2 The Commission did not, however,
take the study too seriously, and voted against accepting the creditors'
proposals to prohibit Chapter 7 for some debtors.'" Having devoted
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994).
94. See id. § 523(a)(1).
95. See I1U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. If 1997); see generally Klein, supra note 90, at
723 & n.44 (discussing the fact that the debtor must always pay nondischargeable debts); Warren,
supra note 20, at 1089 (mentioning that debtor must pay nondischargeable debts, such as student
loans, anyway).
96. Eventually in response to GAO criticisms, the CRC did analyze some of these issues.
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
97. See Klein, supra note 90, at 716; Klein, supra note 91, at 294-95.
98. "Although three years is the presumptive length of a Chapter 13 plan under current law,
much of the CRC study is focussed on how many Chapter 7 debtors could afford to make payments under a five-year plan." Klein, supra note 90, at 717 (footnote omitted).
99. " he debtor's income and expenses stated on the petition are assumed to continue, uninterrupted and unchanged, for the duration of the payment period." CRC STUDY, supra note 56, at
10. Others have also pointed out this problem with the CRC study. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY:

THE

CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER REPORT ON DEBTORS' ABILITY

TO PAY 3-4, 7-9 (1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Klein, supra note 90, at 719; Warren, supra
note 20, at 1089.
100. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 90; GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 3-4;
Klein, supra note 90, at 719; Resolved, supranote 44, at 44.
101. See Klein, supra note 90, at 719-20.
102. See Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al.
103. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 89-91; see also Warren, supra note 64, at
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many hours to studying the matter, they noticed that no one was saying
there was a big problem except the creditors.'" Moreover, the consumer
advocates disputed
what the creditors were saying and so did other
"neutral" groups.'05 The Commission also questioned whether the additional amounts that could be collected from Chapter 7 debtors were sufficient to justify the expense of setting up a large bureaucracy necessary
to consider every debtor's budget and closely monitor each case. 6
After the Commission had been in session for a number of months,
the creditors began to realize that the Commission disagreed with them.
Hence, even though they were among those who pushed hardest for establishment of the Commission, the creditors began attacking it. They
took their case to Congress without even awaiting the Commission's report,"7 and they did not go to Congress by themselves. The creditors
hired virtually every top lobbying firm in Washington, spending millions of dollars. '°s A report in The Washington Post in early 1998 listed
numerous big lobbying firms hired by the creditors, including those
employing Haley Barbour, former head of the Republican National
Committee, to lobby Republicans, and Lloyd Bentsen, the former
Treasury Secretary and Senator, to lobby the Democrats.9 As mentioned earlier, Representative Gekas quoted his "former colleague" Mr.
Bentsen while introducing his bill."0 Mr. Bentsen had written an op-ed
piece espousing the creditor position in The Washington Times, without
revealing he was a paid lobbyist.'' The Post article mentioned that a bill
introduced by Representative McCollum was "similar" to a measure
drafted by another law firm hired by the creditors," which essentially

496 (mentioning that the Commission adopted the plan opposing the credit industry's plan);
Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al ("[The Commission] rejected the creditors' more far-reaching
proposals.").
104. See COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 14, at 89-91.
105. See id.; Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al.
106. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 90; see also Warren, supra note 20, at 109091 (questioning whether the increased costs and fees involved with the creditors' proposals are
worth the alleged increase in the amounts actually paid to creditors in bankruptcy cases); Warren,
supra note 64, at 505-06 (discussing the expense of the shifting of judicial resources resulting
from adopting a means test).
107. See Klein, supra note 91, at 293; Rodney Ho, Bankruptcy Panel's Ideas Anger Creditors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1997, at A2; Schlesinger, supranote 69, at Al.
108. See Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al; Seelye, supra note 29, at A18.
109. See McAllister, supranote 69, at A23.
110. See 144 CONG. REc. E88-89 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
111. See Lloyd Bentsen, Get Tough on Bankruptcy Laws, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at
A19.
112. See McAllister, supranote 69, at A23.
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was the same as the bill Representative Gekas ultimately introduced."'
More recently, the venerable Lloyd Cutler, a legendary Washington superlawyer, if not an authority on consumer bankruptcy, testified on behalf of the creditors at a hearing."4 It is doubtful that he did it for free.
The lobbyists then took their clients' proposals to every member of
the House of Representatives to get sponsors for their bill."5 They took
with them their catch phrases, their study, and their campaign contributions. Moreover, they also kept up their media barrage, buying big ads
in Roll Call, the Capitol Hill newspaper, talking about the bankruptcy
crisis and the need for common sense, needs-based reform." 6 There
were even television commercials in the Washington D.C. area to influence members of Congress. These ads talked about how bankruptcy
costs every household $400 per year."'
But where did that $400 number come from? As far as we can tell,
it comes from taking the $40 billion in unsecured debts that creditors
say are "erased" in bankruptcy, 8 and dividing it by 100 million American households.1 9 The only problem with doing that is that almost none
of those debts included in the $40 billion would have been paid even if
no bankruptcy case were filed. '2 Even the creditors' study claimed that
only 10-15% could be paid. 2 ' Considering all of the problems with their
study, that number is probably too high by a factor of ten or fifteen.'
Most of the remaining amount that creditors say could be repaid is
probably made up of debts that still are being paid; therefore, $40 billion number consists almost entirely of debts that the creditors admit the
debtors cannot afford to pay and debts that debtors still continue to pay
after bankruptcy. The real losses that can be attributed solely to bank113. See 144 CONG. REc. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
114. See Bankruptcy Revision, Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the
House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998), available in Westlaw, Congtmy Library, 1998 WL
8992754 (testimony of Lloyd N. Cutler).
115. See McAllister, supra note 69, at A23; Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al; Seelye, supra
note 29, at A18.
116. For an example of such advertisements, see ROLL CALL, July 27, 1998, at 7.
117. "'The credit industry has launched a massive media and lobbying campaign to discredit
the consumer bankruptcy system."' Hershey, supra note 73, at 10 (quoting Gary Klein, National
Consumer Law Center); see also Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al ("[Creditors publish] the results
[of their studies] in advertisements decrying 'bankruptcies of convenience.').
118. See Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al.
119. This 100 million household number comes from the estimates of the United States Census Bureau. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES
1997, at 59 tbl.66 (117th ed. 1997).
120. See Klein, supra note 91, at 304 n.71.
121. See CRC STUDY, supra note 56, at 26 tbl.12.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
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ruptcy are most likely no more than 1% of that $40 billion. But that has
not stopped the creditors from continuing to use the number and newspapers from printing it. In fact, the $400 per household number appeared, unquestioned, in the New York Times, our supposed newspaper
of record."z
Not surprisingly, when they were approached by their friends the
lobbyists, members of Congress who knew nothing about bankruptcy
were receptive to the creditors' proposed solutionsz' The increased
number of cases, more than a million in times of "prosperity," sounded
like a problem in need of a solution. Yet only an enterprising few representatives contacted consumer representatives to find out if there was
another side to the story. The creditor bill soon had 150 sponsors."
When consumer advocates and I spoke to some of them later, it was
clear that they knew little of the content of the bill. They saw the bill as
a way of solving the so called "bankruptcy problem." After all, following all the flurry of creditor generated media coverage, it was by then
accepted that the rise in bankruptcy filings was indeed alarming.'26
Of course, an Association of Future Bankruptcy Debtors of America, which could take the other side in the lobbying debate, does not exist. Not many people think of themselves that way. Past bankruptcy
debtors are glad to have the experience behind them and do not wish to
publicize their bankruptcies. Consequently, the only voices on the other
side are relatively unorganized; a few overextended consumer organizations and some bankruptcy professionals who do not have millions of
dollars to spend on public relations and campaign contributions. 27
What is the creditors' solution-the bill Representative Gekas introduced.'2 A detailed discussion of every aspect of that bill is beyond
the scope of this Article. Put simply, it is literally a wish list of every-

123. See Hershey, supranote 73, at 10. The $400 per household number also appeared on the
front page of The Wall StreetJournal,another highly respected newspaper. See Schlesinger, supra
note 69, at Al.
124. See Schlesinger, supranote 69, at Al.
125. See John Berlau, Bankruptcy: A New Entitlement?, INV. Bus. DAILY, Mar. 13, 1998, at
Al; see also Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al (stating that the bill that eventually became the basis for Representative Gekas' bill had 150 sponsors within two months).
126. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at iii. In fact, Representative Gekas stated that
the increase in bankruptcy filings was "alarming" when he introduced his bill to the House of Representatives. See 144 CONG. REC. E88 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
127. For a discussion of the money spent by the creditors on public relations firms and campaign contributions for the purpose of having the consumer bankruptcy laws changed to allegedly
allow them to collect more money from consumers who file bankruptcy, see Schlesinger, supra
note 69, at Al.
128. See supranotes 3-12 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:33

thing the creditors ever wanted to change about bankruptcy laws, and if
enacted into law, it would not leave much reason for anyone to file a
bankruptcy case. Among other things, it would make it much harder for
people to save their homes from foreclosure, 29 and make it much easier
for creditors to threaten debtors with repossessions and litigation.' The
bill also includes the wish list of the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"),' certainly an odd addition coming from a Republican Party
that has spent the past year demonizing that agency.3 2 It goes way beyond the supposed "needs-based" bankruptcy concept, that part is only
worthy of a brief discussion.
Remember the slogan put forth by the creditors: Only as much
bankruptcy relief as the debtor needs.'33 It suggests an individualized
determination of need based on each family's income and expenses.
Well, the bill introduced by Representative Gekas is the precise opposite. It is based on mechanical formulas that do not look at individual
income or expenses. First of all, the bill assumes the debtor's average
income for the past six months will continue for the next year.'-' If the
debtor works for three months and then gets laid off for three months
and is still laid off when he or she files for bankruptcy, the proposed
legislation assumes that the debtor's income is significantly higher than
it actually is. This is a result of the bill including the months the debtor
had a job that currently does not exist in its average.
On the expense side, the bill adopts the IRS' "bread and water"
living standards and assumes that is what the debtor will spend. 3 If the
debtor in reality spends more for rent, perhaps because the debtor lives
in a high rent area, or for a long commute to work, or has some other
expense not included in the IRS hypothetical standards, the debtor has
to file an explanation for this "extraordinary expense," which carries
with it a difficult burden of proof 13 6 Furthermore, the debtor may quite
possibly have to go to a hearing to overcome a creditor's objection and
convince a court that the expense is warranted, all of which entails additional time and expense. If the debtor lost or, more likely, could not

129.
130.
131.
132.
May 14,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 130.
See id. § 124.
See generally id. §§ 501-519 (stating the tax provisions of the bill).
See Greg Hitt, It's All About Dough: Schmidt Baking Beat the IRS in Court, WALL ST. J.,
1998, at Al.
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
SeeH.R. 3150,§ 101.
See id.; see also Hildebrand, supranote 79, at 16 n.2 (mentioning the details of the bill).
See H.R. 3150, § 102.
See id.
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afford to contest the case, a family might have to move to a less expensive neighborhood, pull the kids out of school, or give up caring for an
elderly relative since the IRS does not take into account expenses for
people like elderly relatives.'38 The probable result would be that the
debtor would simply forego the ability to get bankruptcy relief at all.
It is interesting that the Republicans base their bill on the IRS collection techniques, but maybe it is all right if the proceeds from those
collection techniques will go to private interests rather than the government. Of course, all of these calculations, objections, and hearings
would also greatly increase the costs of bankruptcy courts and trustees
at taxpayer expense.' Many more judges, courtrooms, and all the other
accouterments will be needed. Again, these are not your typical Republican objectives.
To briefly recap, the bill has a formula based on phantom income
that the debtor may no longer have and hypothetical expenses that may
bear no relation to the debtor's expenses. It then uses this income and
expense calculation to see if a debtor can pay 20% of unsecured debts;
if so, the debtor may not file under Chapter 7.' 40 Thus, the debtors who
have run up their debts the most are let off the hook. In fact, debtors
would have an incentive to incur more debt before filing a bankruptcy
case. At the same time, the bill also does almost nothing about unlimited homestead exemptions in states like Florida, where rich people can
shelter millions of dollars from their creditors.' 4' The only requirement
is that the debtor lives in the state, like Florida, for twelve months before bankruptcy, rather than six months. 42 In other words, it does nothing to the biggest high rollers and the worst credit abusers. Perhaps this
has something to do with the fact that Representative
McCollum, one of
143
the original sponsors of the bill, is from Florida.
Moreover, the bill certainly does nothing to restrain the avalanche
of credit we have seen in recent years. Some academics believe it will
lead to more, rather than less, risky lending. 45 A competing bill, introduced by Representatives Jerrod L. Nadler of New York and John
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1994).
139. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1090-91.
140. See H.R. 3150, § 101.
141. See Higgins, supranote 13, at 77.
142. See H.R. 3150, § 181; Higgins, supranote 13, at 77.
143. See 144 CONG. REc. E87 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
144. See Anne Marriot, A Special Report: Credit CardFever, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1997, at
Al. In fact, credit card debt has increased even more in recent years than bankruptcy filings. See
Docter, supra note 32, at 1.
145. See, e.g, Ausubel, supranote 13, at 251, 270.
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Conyers of Michigan, takes a much narrower approach, focusing on a
small number of high income debtors who might actually be able to pay
something.' 46 It also penalizes creditors who push debtors over the edge,
who lend the most recklessly when it should have been obvious that the
debtor could not afford to pay.' 47 These creditors hurt not only debtors,
but also other more responsible creditors, since all creditors lose out
when a debtor files bankruptcy, not just those that lend recklessly. Unfortunately, the Nadler-Conyers bill does not have armies of lobbyists
pushing it, so it probably will not get very far.
Nevertheless, there are a few rays of hope. Senators Richard Durbin and Charles Grassley asked the General Accounting Office
("GAO") to evaluate the Staten Study, and recently the GAO came back
with a report that was sharply critical of the study's methodology.' The
GAO report criticized it for many of the reasons that are discussed
above, 49 and because the study did not use statistically valid techniques. 50 It also pointed out that the CRC study does not take into account the costs of Chapter 13,'' where the debtor's attorney's fees are
higher and the court-appointed trustee takes a percentage of every payment as an administrative fee, usually about 10%.52 Professor Staten
quickly redid his study and finally subtracted some of the debts that
were going to be paid anyway. 5 3 The new numbers were stated differently, but they were a lot lower." Instead of stating that 25% of the
debtors could pay 30% of debts, the new numbers were stated in dollars.
The top 25% could pay about $2500 over five years, about $500 a year
toward unsecured debts. 55 This amounts to approximately 6% of the average $40,000 in unsecured debts that Professor Staten attributed to
Chapter 7 debtors, 6 although the debtors with the greatest ability to repay, measured in dollars, probably have significantly higher than average debts. The creditors also commissioned another study, this one by
146. See Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998, H.R.
3146, 105th Cong. § 8; see also Higgins, supranote 13, at 76 (discussing the Nadler bill).
147. See H.R. 3146, § 2.
148. See GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 1-6.
149. See id. at 2-6; see also supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the CRC's study).
150. See GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 2-6.
151. See id. at 20.
152. See Klein, supra note 90, at 724 & nn.50 & 52.
153. See CRC RESPONSE, supranote 86, at 3-4, 11 tbl.3.
154. See id. at 11 tbl.3.
155. See id. These figures are calculated on the assumption that debtors would reaffirm all of
their non-housing debts. See id. at 4.
156. Seeid. at9tbl.1.
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the accounting firm of Ernst and Young, that claimed that only 8-14%
of Chapter 7 debtors would be impacted by the means test in Representative Gekas' bill. 57
These numbers still do not take into account the increased fees,
which by themselves would cut the potential repayment almost to zero.
The Chapter 13 trustee's percentage fee is charged on all secured and
unsecured debt payments."' Therefore, if a debtor pays $250 per month
on a car loan, the fees on that payment alone would be more than $1500
over five years. The attorney's fees for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy are at
least $500 higher than those charged for Chapter 7 in most places,'59 and
even Professor Staten recognizes that some amount of income has to be
reserved in a debtor's budget for unexpected emergencies.'9 Adding all
of these additional costs into the mix would totally exhaust the $2500
that would supposedly have been available to creditors.16' And that does
not take into account the likelihood that most of the plans would fail.' 62
At best, the additional returns to creditors from such a system would be
minimal, probably less than the costs of running the system.'63
However, this did not phase the creditors for long. They just paid
for a few more studies and some more press releases '6 The GAO dis157. See POL'Y ECONS. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS GROUP, ERNST & YOUNG LLP,
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONERS' ABILITY TO REPAY: ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM
BANKRUPTCY PETON FHLES 17 (1998) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG STUDY 1]. Ernst & Young
subsequently released a second study focusing on the national effects of Representative Gekas'
bill. In that national perspective study it was found that about "15 percent of 1997 Chapter 7 filers
would have been impacted by the needs-based provision of H.R. 3150 and required to file Chapter
13." POL'Y ECONS. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS GROUP, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCY PETITIONERS' ABILITY TO REPAY: THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 1997, at i (1998)
[hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG STUDY III.
158. A Chapter 13 trustee receives at most 10 percent of all payments made pursuant to a
debtor's Chapter 13 plan. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
159. See Klein, supra note 90, at 724 n.52; see also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 550 (1993) ("Median chapter 13
fees were higher than median chapter 7 fees ....
").
160. See CRC RESPONSE, supra note 86, at 2.
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
162. See sources cited supranote 100. In his reply to the GAO's criticisms of his study, Professor Staten admitted that only about 36% of Chapter 13 plans are completed. See CRC RESPONSE, supra note 86, at 2.
163. Others also question whether the actual additional returns to creditors will be worth the
additional expenses put on the bankruptcy system. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 90, at 740; Warren,
supra note 20, at 1091.
164. "When the credibility of the CRC study was challenged, the credit industry responded by
hiring more studies.... Undeterred, the credit industry paid for yet another study to be released as
the GAO was making its unfavorable report on the earlier studies." Warren, supra note 20, at
1092-93. For a discussion of the credit industry's funded studies, public relations firms, and media
blitzes to attempt to have legislation passed in its favor, see Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al.
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credited these studies too,'6 but it is likely that the industry will always
be able to stay one or two studies, and ten press releases, ahead of the
GAO.
That is where we are today. As the 105th Congress headed for adjournment, both the Senate and House had passed bankruptcy bills,6'
which would have fundamentally limited consumers' rights to relief,
bills opposed by almost every major bankruptcy organization, by consumer groups, by academics, by bankruptcy judges, and by trustees.'67
Essentially, no one supported these bills except the credit industry.

However, the Senate bill, which was more in keeping with the views of
the White House, was not radical enough for the credit industry lobby
and its proponents in the House and Senate. When their Conference Report rejected all of the moderating provisions that had been added in the
Senate, Senate Democrats and the White House refused to agree to it
and the legislation failed to win final passage.' It is certain to be reintroduced early in the 106th Congress and it is certain the credit industry
will spend many millions of dollars more on lobbying and public relations.

Recalling a bit of history is a fitting conclusion here. In the early
1980s, the consumer credit industry mounted a similar attack on the
bankruptcy laws. 69 The credit industry blamed the still recent BRA for a
new rise in bankruptcy cases.' 70 They argued, even back then, that the
stigma was gone. 7 ' They said that people who can afford to pay their
debts were filing bankruptcy. 7 2 They began a press campaign and an-

165. See Warren, supra note 20, at 1093.
166. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
167. See Higgins, supra note 13, at 74-75 (consumer groups and bankruptcy lawyers);
Schlesinger, supra note 69, at Al (commenting on a "community of experts-judges, lawyers and
scholars" criticizing the bill); Seelye, supranote 29, at A18 (consumer groups). See, e.g., Warren,
supranote 20, at 1100-01 (academics).
168. See Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Measure Dies As Talks Fail to Net 'Good Faith'
Compromise, 67 U.S.L.W. 2231, 2231-32 (1998).
169. See Paul M. Black & Michael J. Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984
Consumer CreditAmendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RIcH. L. REv. 845, 845-46 (1985);
Vein Countryman, Bankruptcy and the IndividualDebtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to
the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 821-22 (1983).
170. See sources cited supra note 169.
171. See Warren Brown, Bankruptcy Awaits Its Day in Court, WASH. PosT, Mar. 4, 1984, at
H1.
172. See Black & Herbert, supra note 169, at 846; Countryman, supra note 169, at 822; see
also Brown, supra note 171, at HI ("Mhe 1978 bankruptcy law 'made it easier' for debtors to file
'and may have created an environment where many felt it was more acceptable to file for bankruptcy' .... ") (quoting Joseph W. Duncan, principal author of a Dun & Bradstreet 1984 report on
bankruptcy).
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nounced a CRC study which purported to find that nearly 40% of debtors could repay at least half their debts. 73 Over 200 co-sponsors introduced a bill and eventually Congress enacted much of what the creditors
1 75
wanted.' 74 The bill reduced the amount of property debtors could keep,
made more debts immune to the bankruptcy discharge, 76 and added a
provision to prevent "substantial abuse" by debtors who could pay their
debts. Creditor lobbyists and spokesmen declared victory; the problem
was solved.
What happened? Bankruptcies started going up faster than they had
before. 71 This ought to teach us that changes in the bankruptcy laws do
not cause bankruptcy cases. Debt causes bankruptcy cases, and with deregulation at that same time in history, 79 consumer debt exploded. Furthermore, this did not just happen here in the United States. The rate of
bankruptcy filings in Canada, where the bankruptcy laws are very different but the consumer credit market is similar, went up just as much as
ours did.'
In the end, the bankruptcy debate is about the basic concept of the
fresh start, which has been a part of our laws for a hundred years. 8' Its
roots go back much further, to the Biblical concept of forgiveness; in
Deuteronomy it states that every seven years there shall be a release of
debts. 8 2 There is also a more practical reason-a fear that if people are
forced to remain buried in debt they will give up hope, and become, if
not public charges, dependent on welfare, discouraged, and depressed so
they cannot again become productive members of the mainstream economy. That, in essence, is what bankruptcy is about-restoring hope and

173. See CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORIGINS AND
EFFECrS 72 (1982).
174. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§§ 301-24, 98 Stat. 333, 352-58.
175. See id. § 306, 98 Stat. at 353.
176. See id. § 307, 98 Stat. at 353-54.
177. See id. §312, 98 Stat. at355.
178. See F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
187, 187, 189 (1998).
179. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
180. See Jacob S. Ziegel, Canada's Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.
383, 389-90 (1996).
181. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 364-65 (1991); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (stating
that a primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was to give debtors discharge and fresh
start); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1393 (1985) ("Discharge, the doctrine that frees the debtor's future income from the chains of
previous debts, lies at the heart of bankruptcy policy.").
182. See Deuteronomy 15:1 (King James).
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dignity to people. It has helped millions of people save their homes,
their jobs, their marriages, their mental health, and even their lives in
the past twenty years. Let's hope Congress figures out that it ought to be
proud of the bankruptcy laws it has enacted-before it is too late.
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